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We explore the extent to which social capital can play a role in imparting information about 
the returns to saving where potential knowledge gaps and mistrust exists. Using data from 
Vietnam we find strong evidence to support the hypothesis that information transmitted via 
reputable social organizations increases the proportion of liquid assets held in the form of 
deposits that yield a return. Our results imply that targeting information on the benefits of 
deposit  saving  through  formal  networks  or  groups  would  be  effective  in  increasing  the 
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1. Introduction 
 
Where formal institutions or the state fail to ensure the efficient operation of markets, 
social capital can play an important role. In this paper we examine the role that social 
capital can play in correcting for information failures in financial markets in rural 
communities. We consider a situation where information failures exclude households 
from interest-bearing savings products by artificially increasing the perceived level of 
risk associated with them leading households to choose either not to save or to save in 
a low yielding form (for example, cash held at home).
2 We propose a mechanism 
through  which  social  capital  corrects  for  such  information  failures  through  an 
endogenous  network  effect  whereby  the  informed  savings  behavior  of  pre-defined 
groups  within  the  community  sends  positive  signals  to  individuals  within  the 
community,  increasing  their  level  of  trust  and  reducing  the  perceived  riskiness 
associated with formal saving. To test our hypotheses we consider the case of rural 
Vietnam  and  analyze  how  the  savings  behavior  of  formal  socio-political  groups 
impacts on individual household decisions in relation to precautionary saving. We 
find  strong  evidence  to  support  the  hypothesis  that  information  transmitted  via 
reputable social organizations increases the proportion of liquid assets  held in the 
form  of  deposits  that  yield  a  return.  In  a  policy  context,  our  results  imply  that 
targeting information on the benefits of saving in financial institutions or local savings 
groups through formal social networks or groups would be effective in increasing the 
proportion of total saving held in interest-bearing form. This may also be the case for 
other  developing  countries,  in  particular,  those  that  have  well  established  formal 
groups  already  operating  at  grassroots  level  as  is  the  case  in  many  other  Asian 
economies. 
 
This paper is motivated by two separate considerations. First, household savings are 
an important determinant of welfare and so promoting savings at the household level 
is  important  for  economic  development.  In  particular,  savings  (along  with  the 
accumulation  of  other  assets)  act  as  an  important  buffer  against  income  shocks, 
particularly  where  access  to  credit  is  scarce  (Deaton,  1992).  Moreover,  savings 
constraints, coupled with credit constraints, may hinder productive investment.
3 A key 
issue for developing countries, however, is the extent to which households can access 
financial products, particularly deposit products. Rosenzweig  (2001) finds that the 
proximity  of  formal  financial  institutions  crowds  out  other  informal  insurance 
arrangements. However, for low-income households there may be many barriers to 
saving  in  formal  financial  institutions  aside  from  access  including  a  lack  of 
knowledge  or  information  potentially  leading  to  mistrust  and  uncertainty  about 
available returns.
4 Poor households are therefore more likely to save money as cash 
held in their homes, an insecure form of saving that does not yield a return (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2007). In many cases, information and trust problems can effectively be 
eliminated at local level rather than requiring costly state-wide policies. This can be 
achieved through either the establishment of informal savings and credit groups to 
                                                 
2 See Banerjee and Duflo (2007) for a general overview of the economic situation of households in 
developing countries. 
3 Dupas and Robinson (2009) find that opening interest-free savings accounts had a positive impact on 
the productive investment levels of women in Kenya. 
4  Other  barriers  include  high  opening  balance  requirements  and  minimum  deposit  amounts, 
complicated and unclear procedures, costs associated with travelling to the institution and impersonal 
or unfriendly service (ILO, 2007).   3 
substitute for the formal market or through the sharing of information and expertise on 
the merits of formal saving and the process involved.
5 While it is well established in 
the literature that risk-sharing among social groups through a system of transfers and 
loans is an important mechanism for risk coping among the rural poor (Coate and 
Ravallion, 1993; Townsend, 1994; Udry, 1994; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; Ligon 
et al., 2002), the role of social capital in facilitating more prudent savings behavior is 
much less understood. Some recent advances in the literature have used experimental 
approaches  to  try  and  uncover  the  role  of  trust,  financial  information  and  social 
learning  in  financial  decision  making.  For  example,  Ballinger  et  al.  (2003)  using 
experimental methods find that social learning improves individuals’ ability to solve 
life cycle precautionary savings models. Cole et al. (2009) using a randomized field 
experiment in two rural regions of India find that trust and information are important 
in financial market participation. The second motivation for our paper is that the role 
of social capital, trust and information in the context of household savings decision 
has not yet been explored in the literature. 
 
The  role  of  social  networks,  particularly  in  developing  country  contexts,  is  well 
documented.
6 Fafchamps (2006) provides an overview of the importance of social 
capital for development. Informal networks act as a substitute for formal institutions 
where the latter are weak. In particular, they can facilitate information sharing and 
efficient exchanges by eliminating information asymmetries associated with mistrust 
and search. A key consideration is how to define and identify the network or group 
that represents social capital. Most of the empirical literature identifies interpersonal 
relationships amongst members within villages or communities through conducting 
detailed surveys (see for example, Conley and Udry (2001), Fafchamps and Lund 
(2003)  and  Fafchamps  and  Gubert  (2007)  amongst  others).  However,  Fafchamps 
(2006) suggests that the personalized trust, built up through interpersonal interactions, 
will  only  benefit  the  actual  members  of  the  network  leading  to  social  capital 
potentially having negative distributional effects. In contrast, generalized trust that 
arises  from  general  knowledge  about  a  group  or  a  population  is  accessible  to 
everyone.  As  such,  groups  that  reach  everyone  in  a  community  may  be  a  more 
effective  vehicle  for  eliminating  information  failures.  Bowles  and  Gintis  (2002) 
identify  the  role  of  communities  in  governance  and  highlight  the  fact  that 
communities  possess  private  information  that  neither  the  market  nor  the  state  has 
access to that may allow them to more effectively correct for local market failures. 
Communities have the ability to sustain the social norms of trust and cooperation both 
of which are necessary ingredients for effective community governance.
7 Bowles and 
Gintis suggest that for community governance to work effectively it also requires a 
legal environment that facilitates their functioning. In other words, an institutional 
structure that allows the state, markets and communities to collectively govern and 
interact is essential. 
                                                 
5 Local insurance and credit markets may also act as substitutes for saving, particularly where savings 
are precautionary. However, in many developing country contexts access to formal insurance and credit 
markets may be even more limited than savings 
6 For example, Conley and Udry (2001) illustrate the importance of social networks for technology 
diffusion in the household agricultural sector in Ghana. Bandiera and Rasul (2006) show the role of 
networks in the adoption of sunflower, a new cash crop, in Mozambique. Barr (2000) and Fafchamps 
and Minten (2002) show how social networks also affect entrepreneurial activity in Africa. 
7  Communities  also  possess  the  ability  to  enforce  these  norms  through  retribution  which  is  also 
essential for effective community governance although not relevant to the particular case we explore in 
this paper.   4 
 
We combine both of these ideas by considering the network to consist of members of 
formal  groups  or  organizations  that  operate  within  local  communities.  Vietnam 
provides an ideal case study for exploring both the role of community governance 
structures of the Bowles and Gintis kind in practice and for distinguishing between 
personalized and generalized trust as proposed by Fafchamps. As a centrally planned 
economy,  the  state  plays  a  dominant  role  in  the  functioning  of  the  Vietnamese 
economy, however, under the umbrella of the Communist Party, a variety of local 
socio-political  organizations  exist  that  play  an  important  role,  both  socially  and 
economically,  in  local  communities.  These  organizations,  the  most  prominent  of 
which include Women’s Unions, Farmer’s Unions and Veteran’s Unions, follow a 
hierarchical structure with official leaders (paid through government funds) operating 
at the central, province, district and commune level, managing the activities of the 
organization and working with members within the relevant unit. The nature of the 
organizational structure of these groups suggests that active members at grassroots 
level will have the right incentives to behave in a socially beneficial way so as to 
avoid retribution. In addition, since these groups operate under the umbrella of the 
State, the activities of these local organizations complement the strategy and policies 
of  the  State.  Furthermore,  active  members  of  these  organizations  within  regions 
potentially  establish  a  form  of  personalized  trust  through  their  interpersonal 
interactions at meetings and so group membership can act as an important vehicle 
through which information can be shared. Moreover, if members are known to have 
superior information about markets, given that they operate under the mandate of the 
State, non-members in observing the behavior of members may also benefit through 
information  spillovers  (or  positive  externalities or  reputation  effects).  In  this  way, 
these groups could even be thought of as possessing a form of generalized trust and as 
such  the  behavior  of  members  may  impact  on  the  behavior  of  non-members  thus 
benefiting everyone. 
 
In  this  paper,  we  contribute  to  the  literature  in  two  ways.  First,  we  develop  a 
mechanism through which community based  groups, in the form of formal socio-
political groups behaving in the same way as other measures of social capital, can 
effectively correct for information failures in rural financial markets. This is achieved 
through  the  sharing  of  information  about  the  security  and  returns  to  savings  both 
within the network and with those outside the network through information spillovers. 
Second, we provide empirical evidence of this mechanism at work in local financial 
markets in Vietnam using a unique and carefully constructed dataset. Overall, this 
paper contributes to our understanding of the important role that social capital can 
play in the development process and is the first to link social capital to household 
savings decisions. The results can be generalized to other developing countries, in 
particular those with similar formal social networks operating at grassroots level. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. We present the theoretical framework in Section 2, 
followed by the empirical approach in Section 3. The data are described in Section 4, 
while we present and discuss the empirical results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
   5 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
The motivations for household or individual savings have been extensively explored 
in the literature (see, for example, Gersovitz (1988)
8 and more recently Browning and 
Lusardi  (1996)).  Precautionary  motives  are  particularly  relevant  in  developing 
countries where income is volatile and other consumption smoothing mechanisms are 
limited, including access to credit.
9 Our starting point for analyzing precautionary 
savings follows most of the literature modeling savings behavior under risk in using a 
standard inter-temporal allocation model where  in each time period the household 
must decide how much to consume and how much to invest in accumulating assets 
(including savings) which will act as a buffer against unexpected income shocks (see 
for  example,  Deaton  (1991,  1992)  and  Fafchamps  et  al.  (1998)).  We  assume 
households are credit constrained.
10 
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where d  is the rate of time preference and  ( ) it i C U  is the utility function. We assume 
that households are risk averse, i.e.  ( ) 0 ' ' < it i C U , and have precautionary savings, i.e. 
( ) ''' 0 i it U C > .
11 
 
In  each  time  period,  each  household  randomly  receives  income,  ( ) it it s y ,  which 
depends on the state of nature  it s  facing the household in time period t. The state of 
nature includes all exogenous shocks to income that can affect the whole community 
(such as a natural disaster) or the individual households (such as the death of the main 
income earner). Since households are risk averse they accumulate liquid wealth (or 
precautionary savings) to act as a buffer against such income shocks. Total wealth 
(liquid) of the household at time  t is given by  it A  which yields a return  it r . The 
Belman equation corresponding to the household’s decision problem takes the usual 
form: 
 
                                                 
8 Gersovitz (1988) groups savings as follows: (1) Life cycle savings, where households consider the 
relationship between age and income as a savings motive, especially to secure welfare after retirement; 
(2) Precautionary savings, where households save to protect themselves in the event of shocks; (3) 
Investment  saving,  where  the  saving  household  is  motivated  by  rates  of  return  or  investment 
opportunities; and (4) Bequest savings, where households save for the future benefit of other persons 
related to them. 
9 Fafchamps and Pender (1997) find that while poor households save for both precautionary reasons 
and to finance investment, particularly where credit is not available, low returns on saving prevent 
them from investing in profitable investment, in particular, non-divisible larger investments. As such, 
in most cases precautionary motives prevail as households remain in a poverty trap. 
10 Deaton (1991) presents a model of inter-temporal consumption behavior in the presence of liquidity 
constraints to explain precautionary motives for holding assets 
11 The former is required to ensure that the utility function is concave so households are risk averse and 
the  latter  is  required  to  ensure  that  the  marginal  utility  function  is  convex  so  uncertainty  induces 
precautionary saving.   6 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 , max 1 | i it it i it it i i i it it it it V X s U X A EV y s r A s d + + + + +   = - + + +    (2) 
 
where  t t it y A X + =  is ‘cash-in-hand’ and  0 1 ³ + it A , i.e. no borrowing. This model 
allows for the accumulation and selling of assets to act as a buffer against income 
shocks. 
 
In this paper, we are particularly interested in understanding the choice of different 
types of saving and so how the composition of the portfolio changes in the face of 
income shocks is our focus. Following Fafchamps et al. (1998), the distribution of the 
returns to accumulating assets will depend on the level and composition of  it A . We 
assume that the only way households can insure against income losses due to such 
shocks  is  to  accumulate  savings.  Since  we  are  not  interested  in  analyzing  the 
aggregate decision to save, nor are we interested in the decision to chose savings over 
other  forms  of  insurance  against  shocks,  to  simplify  the  model  we  assume  that 
purchasing formal insurance, borrowing, or accumulating other liquid assets are not 
possible.  We  allow  for  savings  of  different  forms  and  so  the  household’s  wealth 
portfolio can include cash, gold and jewelry held at home, informal savings held with 
local rotating credit groups or money lenders, or formal savings held in state and 
private owned banks. 
 
We extend the model given in (2) to allow for two assets: cash held at home ( it W ) and 
savings  either  in  the  formal  or  informal  sector  which  we  call  deposits  ( it D ).  We 
assume that the return to holding cash at home is negative ( q - ) given the risk of 
theft.
12 For simplicity we assume that this risk is constant across all households. The 
perceived return to saving in the form of deposits, either in the formal or the informal 
sector we assume to be a function of the information available to the household at 
time  t,  i.e.,  ( ) i it it I g g = ,  where  ( ) ' 0 i it I g > .  This  will  vary  across  households 
depending on how certain or uncertain they are regarding future returns. We assume 
that  the  level  of  certainty  depends  on  how  complete  their  information  is  on  the 
perceived  risk  associated  with  deposit  saving.    Information  can  be  transmitted  to 
households through social networks. Membership of the social network is assumed to 
be randomly assigned across households and so is exogenous to the savings decision. 
For simplicity, we assume that the rate of return is independent of  it s .
13 
 
The combined returns to holding cash at home and deposit savings are given by: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 it it it it it it i it r A A D D D q g h + + + + + + + + = - - + + -     (3) 
 
where  i h  is the cost associated with saving (for  example, travel costs, filling out 
forms, etc.). In this setting, savings in the form of deposits are considered more risky 
                                                 
12 The real value of cash held at home can also potentially be eroded from one year to the next due to 
inflation, and potentially significantly so in typically high inflation developing economies. However, 
since we also consider holding gold and jewelry as a form of home-saving, and they are often held as a 
hedge against inflation, this is not likely to be the case for all forms of home-saving considered. 
13 This is not an unreasonable assumption to make given that most deposit savings accounts offer fixed 
rates of interest that are protected against external shocks.   7 
than home-saving if  it i g h q - < . As such, information can play an important role in 
changing the perceived relative risk associated with different forms of saving. 
 
The revised Belman equation can be written as: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
, max
max 1 1     
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= - - +
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As before no borrowing is allowed so  0 1 1 ³ ³ + + it it D A . 
 
The focus of this paper is on the choice between saving in the form of cash held at 
home and deposit saving for a return (either in the informal or formal sector) so we 
focus on this decision rather than the overall decision to save. In a similar fashion to 
Fafchamps  et  al.  (1998),  assuming  a  negative  exponential  utility  function  and  a 
normal distribution for future consumption, we take a mean variance approximation 
of  the  expected  value  function.  Households  will  choose  1 + it D   to  solve 
(approximately): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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where:  i R   is  the  Arrow-Pratt  absolute  risk  aversion  coefficient,  which  for  the 
exponential utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion.
14 We define the 
expected  value  of  income  as  ( ) it it s y ( ) ( ) 1 | i it it i it E y s s y s +   =   ,  its  variance  as 
( ) ( )
2
1 | i it it yi it V y s s s s +   =   ,  the  expected  value  of  returns  to  deposit  saving  as 
( ) ( ) 1 1 | 1 i it it i it E I I I g g +   + = +     and  its  variance  as  ( ) ( )
2
1 1 | i it it i it V I I I g g s +   + =   , 
where  ( )
2 ' 0 i it I g s <  implying that information reduces the perceived variance in the 
return to saving.  ( ) iy it s g r  is the correlation between income and the returns to saving. 
Given that we assume returns are independent of income shocks we assume that this 
correlation is zero. 
 
















=               (6) 
 
                                                 
14 That is,  ( ) ( ) '' ' R U C U C i i it i it d = - =     , which implies that as wealth increases households hold the 
same level of wealth in the form of risky (or in this case perceived to be risky) assets.   8 
The  model  predicts  that  the  level  of  deposit  saving, 
*
1 it D + ,  will  be  an  increasing 
function  of  the  return  to  saving,  ( ) i it I g ,  and  losses  to  cash  held  at  home,  q . 
Moreover, 
*
1 it D +  will be a decreasing function of the cost associated with saving  i h , 
the variance in the return to saving  ( )
2
i D it I s  and the level of risk aversion  i R . In this 
model, information plays an important role in determining the level of deposit saving. 
We assume that in the absence of information about the return to saving in banks or 
informal groups within the community, households perceive holding cash at home as 
a less risky form of saving.
15 Formal groups transmit information to households on the 
various ways in which they can save to yield a return thus filling an information gap 
and increasing their knowledge about the perceived return, and the perceived variance 
in return, to saving in the form of deposits. This has the affect of increasing  ( ) i it I g  
and reducing  ( )
2
i it I g s  and thereby increasing the level of saving held in the form of 
deposits. 
 
In this paper, we are interested in the proportion of total savings held in the form of 
deposits  and  so  replace 
*
1 it D +   with 
* *
1 1 1 it it it d D A + + + =   and  let  i R   represent  the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion. The model as proposed above is restricted by the 
assumption  of  a  negative  exponential  utility  function  which  implies  that  the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion will be increasing in wealth, that is,  i i R A d = . Re-

















=               (7) 
 
This model predicts that the proportion of liquid assets held in the form of household 
deposit saving will be a decreasing function of wealth if deposit savings are perceived 
to be the more risky asset. This underlying assumption of the model can be tested 
empirically by regressing the proportion of deposit saving in total saving held by the 
household on the household’s level of wealth. Since households’ perceptions of the 
relative riskiness of deposit saving compared with cash held at home will depend on 
the composition of their savings portfolio we decompose wealth into wealth held in 
the form of deposit saving and wealth held in the form of cash at home. The model 
also  predicts  that  information  transmitted  through  the  social  network  improves 
households’ perceptions of the potential returns available from deposit saving and as 
such may lead to an increase in the proportion of deposit saving. This prediction can 
be  tested  empirically  by  including  a  measure  of  such  a  network  effect  in  the 
regression model. 
 
                                                 
15 Returns can also be thought of as incorporating security concerns of households.   9 
3. Empirical Considerations 
 
Following from the theoretical model, in a single period setting the reduced form 
savings equation that we are interested in estimating is given by: 
 
it it it it n it it it v s D W D d + + + + + + = - - - - 5 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0 b h b b b b b       (8) 
 
where:  it d  is the proportion of deposit savings in total savings made by household i 
in time t;  1 - it D  is the stock of deposit saving at the beginning of the period;  1 - it W  is 
the stock of cash saving at the beginning of the period;  1 - -it n D  is the average stock of 
deposit savings of network members at the beginning the period (excluding those of 
household i) which is used to proxy the level of information available to network 
members and as such the expected returns (and variance in returns) from saving in the 
form of deposits;  it h  is a measure of the cost of saving in the form of deposits; and  it s  
are  losses  to  household  income  as  a  result  of  external  shocks.  According  to  our 
theoretical predictions we would expect  0 1 > b ,  0 2 < b , and  3 0 b > . 
 
A key empirical consideration that must be made is how we identify the endogenous 
network effect  1 - -it n D , that is, where the savings behavior of a household is causally 
influenced by the behavior of the group or network present in the local community 
(see also, for example, Manski, (1993, 2000), Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Aizer 
and Currie (2004)). The literature on network effects suggests that this can happen 
through two mechanisms: information, where an individual experiences information 
spillovers as a result of effective group behavior (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 
1992;  Foster  and  Rosenzweig,  1995);  or  social  norms,  where  an  individual’s 
preferences  are  influenced  by  the  behavior  of  the  group  either  through  directly 
affecting tastes or through social pressures (Akerlof, 1980; Borjas, 1992; Bertrand et 
al., 2000). In our application, we might expect the behavior of both group members 
and non members to be affected by group behavior, the latter through information 
spillover effects.  If household savings behavior is found to be significantly influenced 
by the behavior of group members within the region, then this provides evidence of 
effective social networks operating through the community governance structures of 
the socio-political organizations.  From a policy perspective, this would imply that 
specific groups could be targeted for information dissemination in relation to sound 
savings advice as this result would indicate that the behavior of these groups can 
causally influence the behavior of households in general, both group members and 
non-members. 
 
Identifying causality, however, is complicated by a number of factors. First, there is 
the  possibility  of  the  endogeneity  of  group  membership.  While  in  the  theoretical 
model we assume that households are randomly assigned to networks and as such the 
decision  to  be  part  of  a  network  is  exogenous  to  the  savings  decision,  in  reality, 
individuals themselves decide whether or not to become members of formal social 
groups. The consequence for the empirical model is that the unobserved factors that 
determine the proportion of deposit savings in liquid asset holdings of a household 
may be the same as those that determine the probability that they are members of the 
group. To eliminate these factors from the model we use first differenced data and so 
factor  out  any  unobserved  household  specific  effects  that  may  influence  both  the   10 
portfolio  composition  of  households’  precautionary  liquid  asset  holdings  and  the 
probability that they are group members. 
 
The second identification problem is Manski’s (1993) reflection problem, that is, the 
possibility  of  simultaneity  between  individual  behavior  and  group  behavior.  To 
correct  for  reflexivity,  the  network  variable  is  measured  as  the  average  stock  of 
deposit savings by group members at time t-1, excluding the stock of saving held by 
household  i,  1 - -it n D .
16 Third, the network effect may also capture correlated effects, 
where individuals from the same group tend to behave in the same way because they 
have  similar  characteristics  or  face  similar  constraints  and,  fourth,  an  exogenous 
effect, where the individual is influenced by an exogenous characteristic that defines 
group membership. Thus the characteristics of group members must be controlled for 
in the empirical model through the inclusion of time varying household characteristics 
and regional fixed effects. Since the model is estimated separately for group members 
and non-members we eliminate the need for the inclusion of group fixed effects. 
 
We  run  a  number  of  robustness  checks  to  ensure  that  we  have  separated  out  the 
network effect from common unobserved shocks in the area. Using first differences, 
the network effect for group members is defined as the change in the average stock of 
financial saving of group members at the beginning of each  year, where for each 
observation  the  savings  of  the  household  in  question  are  excluded  from  the 
computation  of  the  group  average.  For  non-group  members,  the  network  effect  is 
defined as the deviation in the average stock of saving of group members from the 
household stock of financial saving in the first period. In the main model the network 
effects are defined at province level and province fixed effects are included to control 
for common exogenous shocks that have affected all households within the network. 
The first robustness check we perform is to estimate the model using district level 
fixed effects to ascertain whether the results hold up to the inclusion of more detailed 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity across regions. The second robustness check is 
to redefine the network variable at district level and include district controls to check 
whether the results are dependent on the pre-defined regional scope of the network. 
 
We also consider the possibility that the network effect might be driven by the density 
of the group in a particular region and so the degree of learning will depend on the 
density  of  the  social  network.  More  members  within  the  network  induce  greater 
penetration of information in relation to savings. Alternatively, it could also be the 
case that the larger the network the more diluted their reach and so the less effective 
the group may be in sharing information. A group density variable interacted with the 
network  variable  is  also  included  to  capture  these  possibilities  (see  for  example, 
Bertrand et al. (2000) and Aizer and Currie (2004)). 
 
The empirical model we estimate is: 
 
( ) ( )
i j i it i i n i n
i n i n ` it it it it i
v u ' s den * D
den D W W D D d
+ + a + + + +
+ + - + - + =
- -
- - - -
3 2 1 3
2 1 1 2 1 1 0
Z           D a h D a D D f
D f D f l l a D
    (9) 
 
                                                 
16 Aizer and Currie (2004) use a similar approach.   11 
where  D  indicates  first  differences,  n i den - D   is  the  change  in  the  density  of  the 
network  (less  the  household  in  question  for  group  members),  i Z D   is  a  vector  of 
changes in time varying household characteristics and  j u  are regional fixed effects. 
We use the change in the number of banks within the commune to proxy for the cost 





The  data  are  taken  from  the  Vietnam  Access  to  Resources  Household  Survey 
(VARHS)  implemented  in  2006  and  2008  in  12  provinces  in  Vietnam.
17  The 
households for which a full panel is available are spread over 456 communes, 131 
districts and total 2,158 households. Along with detailed demographic information on 
household members, the survey includes sections on financial behavior, in particular 
in relation to savings and borrowing. Due to the absence of total expenditure data we 
cannot use the standard ‘income minus expenditure’ measure of saving. Instead, the 
focus our investigation is on self-reported levels of saving in the following forms: 
deposits held in formal financial institutions; deposits held with informal savings and 
credit groups and money lenders; and cash and jewelry held at home. 
 
The supply of institutional saving services for rural households is estimated to cover 
65 percent of the poorest quarter of the population (ILO, 2007).
18 This is also evident 
from our data which cover the more rural and remote provinces in Vietnam. In 2006, 
only 35 percent of communes included in the sample had a state bank located in their 
commune and only 19 percent had access to private banks and other types of credit 
organizations.
19 However, 93 percent of communes report having access to formal 
savings deposits through institutions located outside of the commune. In 2008, access 
within communes increased with 56 percent of communes having a state bank and 29 
percent having a private bank or some other form of credit organization. 
 
The  VARHS  records  membership  in  eight  different  groups/organizations,  three  of 
which fall directly under the hierarchical structure of the State.
20 Women’s Unions fall 
under  the  umbrella  organization  of  the  Vietnamese  Women’s  Federation  (VWF), 
Farmer’s Unions operate under the umbrella of the Vietnamese Farmer’s Association 
(VFA)  and  Veteran’s  Unions  under  the  Vietnamese  War  Veteran’s  Association 
(VWVA). All are formed on the basis of the same socio-political ideals. The duties 
and responsibilities of members range from fulfilling the duties of a citizen, actively 
participating  in  community  meetings  and  mutually  supporting  the  work  of  the 
community and the sharing of information to enhance the work of the organization. In 
                                                 
17 The survey was developed in collaboration between the Development Economics Research Group 
(DERG), Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen and the Central Institute of Economic 
Management (CIEM), the Institute for Labour Studies and Social Affairs (ILSSA) and the Institute of 
Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development (IPSARD), Hanoi, Vietnam. 
18 Saving services are offered by five state-owned commercial banks, one social policy bank, one post 
office savings company, 37 joint stock commercial banks, 31 foreign owned bank branches, five joint 
venture banks, 934 People’s Credit Funds (PCFs) and 58 microfinance institutions (ILO, 2007 p.85). 
19 Other credit organizations include People’s Credit Funds and International Organizations. 
20  In  addition  to  the  three  groups  used  in  this  analysis,  the  VARHS  also  collects  information  on 
membership of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Youth Unions, religious organizations, irrigation 
cooperation and informal credit groups.   12 
recent times the role of these organizations has extended to enhancing the economic 
activity of communities. For example, Farmer’s Unions work toward disseminating 
information  on  new  production  technologies  while  Women’s  Unions  work  toward 
facilitating savings and credit teams and providing information on family planning 
and health. Almost all communes have an active organization operating within the 
commune. The VWF, VFA and VWVA have all established agreements with the two 
main state banks in Vietnam (The Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP) and the 
Vietnamese  Bank  for  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  (VBARD))  to  support 
savings and credit groups in local communities. However, savings facilities are only 
offered directly through groups in 7 percent of communes in our sample. 
 
Table 1 provides a description of the savings behavior of households in our sample. 
Our measure of savings includes deposits of which there are formal savings (which 
include postal savings, savings in state owned commercial banks, private banks and 
credit organizations), informal savings (which include ROSCAS
21 and saving through 
private money lenders), and home-saving in the form of cash, gold and jewelry kept at 
home. In 2006, 54 percent of households reported having saved in one of these forms 
in the previous 12 months. This fell to 44 percent of households in 2008. Of particular 
note is the large proportion of households with home-saving (44 percent in 2006 and 
38 percent in 2008) as compared with deposits (17 percent in 2006 and 9 percent in 
2008).  Also  of  note  is  the  decline  in  the  proportion  of  households  with  informal 
savings (from 13 percent in 2006 to 5 percent in 2008). Saving households save more 
in 2008 compared with 2006, even after adjusting for inflation. However in 2006, the 
savings level of the households that continued to save in 2008 was about the same (at 
around 11,153 VND). This suggests that the increase observed is in some part due to a 
fall off in savings by households who save small amounts. An increase in home-
saving is also observed. Home-saving makes up 82 percent of all savings in 2008 
compared with 73 percent in 2006. Savings as a proportion of income (for saving 
households) declined between 2006 and 2008. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In this paper, we are not interested in whether households save the optimal amount but 
instead are concerned with portfolio allocation of savings and how networks affect 
this allocation through the transmission of information. The dependent variable used 
in our empirical analysis is the change in the proportion of total savings made in the 
form  of  deposits  in  2008  compared  with  2006.  For  the  sample  as  a  whole  this 
proportion fell from 14.6 percent in 2006 to 7.8 percent in 2008. The purpose of this 
paper is to explain what brought about such a decline focusing in particular on the role 
of information networks. 
 
Household  networks  are  defined  on  the  basis  of  whether  individuals  within 
households are active members of different groups/organizations within the region 
defined in this paper separately by province and district. There is a high proportion of 
active group membership in households in Vietnam. Women’s Unions and Farmer’s 
Unions play a particularly important role, although the proportion of households with 
active group members declined for our sample between 2006 and 2008 (see Table 2). 
                                                 
21 Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) are very widespread and very popular with low 
income households. They are small, operate locally, accept contributions in-kind (e.g. rice ROSCAs) as 
well as in cash and some have a mutual assistance mechanism.   13 
While these groups share the same structure, they vary in the extent to which they 
have established the infrastructure at the village level for supporting local financial 
markets (through, for example, the establishment of savings and credit groups). An 
important  assumption  which  we  must  make  in  the  empirical  model  is  that  group 
membership itself is not endogenous, that is, that savings considerations are not the 
motivation for being a group member. We justify this assumption on the basis that, 
first, group membership is based on signing up to a set of socio-political ideals rather 
than on availing of facilities offered by the group such as financial advice or savings 
facilities, and second, we only consider active group members who attend meetings 
regularly  and  so  are  more  likely  to  subscribe  to  these  ideals.
22  Nevertheless  to 
circumvent the possibility that the effects we observe are due to selection into these 
groups we attempt to identify two effects: first, the effect of group behavior on group 
members; and second, the effect of group behavior on non-group members within the 
community. 
 
Table 2 describes the savings behavior of these groups. Members of Women’s Unions 
and Farmer’s Unions are more likely to save than households that are non-members in 
both 2006 and 2008. In 2008, households with active members in Veteran’s Unions 
are also more likely to save. In 2006, households with active members in Women’s 
Unions and Veteran’s Unions save more than other saving households, both in terms 
of the level of saving and savings as a proportion of income.
23 It is also the case in 
2006 that deposits, and in particular formal deposits, make up a greater proportion of 
saving for group members compared with non-group members. This suggests that (at 
least  in  2006)  households  that  are  active  members  of  these  groups  have  more 
information on (or a greater level of trust in) formal financial institutions. This is, 
perhaps, not surprising given that both Women’s Unions and Veteran’s Unions have a 
great  deal  of  organizational  support  at  grassroots  level  and  a  long  history  of 
cooperation and support on financial related issues among community members. The 
same picture does not emerge from the 2008 data, however, where saving households 
that are members of groups save on average less than other saving households in the 
sample.  Moreover,  saving  households  that  are  members  of  Women’s  Unions  and 
Farmer’s Unions hold a smaller proportion of their saving in the form of deposits, 
including  formal  deposits,  than  non-member  households.  The  extent  to  which  the 
change in behavior of these groups is causally related to the change in behavior of the 
population as a whole is what we try to uncover in this paper. In particular, we are 
interested  in  the  extent  to  which  the  behavior  of  the  network  can  influence  the 
proportion of saving held in the form of deposits (that can yield a return) as opposed 
to home-saving. The behavior of the network is measured as the average level of 
deposits of group members within a province. Descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 2. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
22  Recent  agreements  between  the  VBSP  and  VBARD  and  these  groups,  aimed  at  helping  these 
organizations reach low income communities, although not yet working on a wide scale, may influence 
group membership in the future (see ILO (2007) for more details). 
23 Members of Farmer’s Unions in both years save less than the average. This may be in part due to the 
fact that in this paper we focus on financial savings and exclude savings in the form of assets such as 
livestock.   14 
In addition to network effects, we consider how changes in other factors may affect 
changes in the proportion of savings held in deposit form. In the theoretical model we 
assume  increasing  relative  risk  aversion  which  implies  that  as  wealth  increases 
households will hold less of their savings in the form of (perceived risky) deposits as 
opposed  to  (perceived  risk-free)  home-saving.  If  we  assume  that  households  view 
deposits  as  the  relatively  riskier  form  of  saving,  due  to  the  absence  of  complete 
information, we would expect that as households become wealthier they hold less 
savings in the form of deposits. The wealth measure that we include is the change in 
the stock of total saving (home-saving and deposits) held at the beginning of each 
year.  We control for changes in access to saving (or the cost of saving) with the 
number of new banks located in the commune between 2006 and 2008. To control for 
income  shocks  we  include  the  change  in  income  between  2006  and  2008  and  a 
dummy variable capturing whether the household had an unexpected income loss due 
to an exogenous shocks.
24 If savings are precautionary we expect households to dis-
save in the event of a shock and it is also likely that they are not able to save in the 
immediate  aftermath.
25  We  also  include  changes  in  household  size  and  whether 
households receive transfers from children living outside of the home as controls. A 
description of all variables included in the model and summary statistics for 2006 and 
2008 are presented in Table 3. Regional controls are also included.
26 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
We first estimate a basic model of household savings decisions where no controls for 
savings costs or network effects are included to ascertain the household characteristics 
that are of importance in households’ decisions to hold deposits as opposed to home-
saving. All variables expressed in VND are scaled by 1,000 before inclusion in the 
model.  The  results  are  presented  in  column  (1)  of  Table  4.  The  wealth  variable, 
measured by the change in the total level of saving (home-saving and deposits) held at 
the beginning of each  year has a different effect depending on the type of saving 
considered. An increase in the stock of savings held in the form of deposits has a 
positive and significant effect on the change in the proportion of financial saving in 
the form of deposits made in the subsequent year. In contrast, an increase in the stock 
of savings held in the form of cash has a negative and significant effect on the change 
in  the  proportion  of  financial  saving  held  in  the  form  of  deposits  made  in  the 
subsequent year. Our theoretical model predicts that households are relatively risk 
averse meaning that as wealth increases they will hold less of it in the form of the 
perceived to be riskier asset. These results suggest that households with more deposit 
saving perceive deposit saving as less risky, holding more of it as wealth increases, 
                                                 
24 Shocks include natural and biological shocks (such as floods, land slide, typhoons, storms, drought, 
pest infestations, crop diseases and avian flu). Data on economic shocks (such as shocks to food and 
crops  prices,  input  shortages,  unemployment,  loss  of  land  and  crime)  and  idiosyncratic  shocks  to 
household members (such as divorce, abandonment, family disputes and serious injury or death of a 
household member) are also available however we only include truly exogenous shocks in our model. 
25  Empirical  evidence  to  support  the  hypothesis  that  households  dis-save  when  confronted  with  a 
negative  income shock  was  provided for example by Udry (1995) using a sample of 200 farmers 
households in northern Nigeria.  
26 In the main models we include province fixed effects but also consider district level fixed effects as 
one of our robustness check.   15 
while  households  with  more  cash  saving  perceive  deposit  saving  as  more  risky, 
holding  less  of  it  as  wealth  increases.  As  expected,  income  has  a  positive  and 
significant  effect  on  the  deposit  ratio,  although,  the  dummy  variable  capturing 
exogenous income shocks has no significant effect. This suggests that while higher 
levels  of  income  lead  to  a  greater  proportion  of  deposit  saving  relative  to  home-
saving, this ratio is not affected by unexpected shocks to income. 
 
None  of  the  other  baseline  factors  considered  are  found  to  have  a  statistically 
significant effect. In column (2) we introduce the cost proxy to the model, that is, the 
change in the number of banks in the commune, however the effect is not statistically 
significant. In columns (3)-(5) we consider how changes in group membership (that 
is, whether the household has active group members), impact on the change in the 
deposit  ratio,  however,  in  all  cases  we  find  that  these  estimated  coefficients  are 
statistically insignificant. For the remainder of the analysis we exclude the cost proxy 
given  its  statistical  insignificance  and  the  fact  that  it  yields  a  reduced  number  of 
observations due to missing data. Even though we find that the controls for changes in 
group membership are insignificant we exclude households that experience such a 
change  from  the  remainder  of  the  analysis  to  circumvent  the  possibility  that  the 
network effects we find are due to changes in the composition of the group rather than 
information sharing. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We  now  introduce  the  network  variables  to  the  model.  The  network  effects  are 
measured as the change in the average stock of deposits of households at the start of 
each year in each group, where the group is defined as households who have active 
group members within the province. For households with active group members, their 
own  household  savings  are  excluded  from  the  computation  of  the  average  stock 
measure.  For  households  that  are  not  group  members  the  network  variable  is 
computed as the deviation of network deposit saving from the household’s deposit 
saving. We control for differences in the density of different groups, noting that the 
larger the group the greater the penetration of information across both group and non-
group members. It may also be the case, however, that the larger the group the less 
effective they may be in influencing behavior since the extent of ‘locality’ of the 
group  is  lessened.  The  models  are  estimated  separately  for  group  and  non-group 
members. The former capture endogenous network effects while the latter capture 
spillover effects of group behavior into the rest of the community. All models are 
estimated in first differences and so household specific effects are controlled for. In 
addition, changes in all baseline characteristics are controlled for and provincial fixed 
effects are also included. The results for group members are presented in Table 5. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table  5,  Panel  A  reports  the  results  for  the  Women’s  Union  networks.  Once  the 
interaction between the density of the group and the network variable is included in 
the model (column (2)), we find that the stock of deposit savings by households with 
active members of Women’s Unions within the province has a positive effect on the 
proportion of deposit saving in total saving of other households with active group 
members. The magnitude of this network effect is large relative to the lifecycle and 
socio  economic  effects  presented  in  Table  4.  The  interaction  term  between  the   16 
network effect and the density of the network is positive and significant indicating 
that  the  larger  the  network  the  greater  the  effect  of  group  behavior  on  household 
behavior. Disaggregating deposits by formal and informal deposits helps to further 
explain the overall effect of networks. We find in column (3) that the level of formal 
deposits has a positive and significant effect while the level of informal deposits has 
no significant effect. This effect is robust to the inclusion of an interaction between 
formal and informal network effects and the density of the network. As column (4) 
reveals the interaction with the density variable is positive and significant indicating 
that the larger the network the greater the network effect through the formal savings 
channel. These results are robust to the inclusion of district level fixed effects in place 
of province level fixed effects (see Panel A of Table A1 in the Appendix). When the 
network is defined district level, however, no significant network effects are found. 
 
Overall,  these  findings  provide  strong  support  for  our  theoretical  predictions.  Our 
theoretical model predicts that information is shared within groups, which reduces the 
perceived risk associated with holding deposits for group members, thereby increasing 
their  perceived  return  relative  to  holding  cash  at  home.  Here,  we  measure  this 
information through the actual savings behavior of other members of the group and 
find that it has a positive and significant effect on the deposit ratio. We also find that 
the larger the group the greater the effect suggesting that larger Women’s Unions may 
be  more  effective  in  influencing  household  behavior.  This  is  consistent  with  our 
finding that when networks are defined at district level no significant network effects 
are found. 
 
We find similar results for Farmer’s Unions as illustrated in Table 5, Panel B. The 
network  effect,  on  aggregate,  is  positive  and  significant  (column  (1)),  even  when 
controlling for the interaction between this and the density of the network (column 
(2)). The overall positive effect is driven by informal deposits (column (3)), but this 
result is not robust to the inclusion of the interaction term between group density and 
the network effect (column (4)). These results are robust to the inclusion of district 
level fixed effects. Similar network effects are also found for Farmer’s Unions when 
the network is defined at district level (see Panel B of Table A1 in the Appendix). 
 
As revealed in Table 5, Panel C, for Veteran’s Unions we only find evidence of a 
network effect when deposits are disaggregated by formal and informal savings and 
the interaction between the density of the network and the network effect is controlled 
for  (column  (4)).  As  for  Women’s  Unions  the  level  of  formal  saving  of  group 
members has a positive impact on the ratio of deposits to total saving. These findings 
are robust to the inclusion of district fixed effects, however, when the network is 
defined at district levels, as was the case for Women’s Unions, no significant network 
effects are found (see Panel C of Table A1 in the Appendix).
27 These findings provide 
further  evidence  for  our  theoretical  predictions,  suggesting  that  networks  can 
potentially  play  an  important  role  in  disseminating  information  on  the  perceived 
riskiness of savings mechanisms thus enabling  households to make more efficient 
savings decisions. It does appear, however, that the size of the network may also be an 
important factor, particularly for Women’s Unions. 
 
                                                 
27 Some caution should be exercised in interpreting the results of the robustness checks for Veteran’s 
Unions given the small number of observations on group members (150) and the inclusion of district 
fixed effects of which there are 131, although many of the latter are excluded due to multicollinearity.   17 
Next we turn to non-group members and analyze how changes in the average level of 
deposit savings by group members relative to the household’s initial stock of saving in 
2006 impacts on the ratio of deposits to total savings for those households. The aim of 
this exercise is to establish the extent to which knowledge spillovers exist in the sense 
that the behavior of the group impacts on the behavior of non-group members. A 
positive  result  would  indicate  that  the  greater  the  change  in  the  stock  of  group 
financial  saving  relative  to  the  households  initial  stock  of  saving  the  more  that 
household saves in the form of deposits in the subsequent period. The results for non-
group members are presented in Table 6. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
For Women’s Unions we find that the change in the level of network deposit savings, 
relative  to  the  households’  initial  stock  of  deposit  savings,  has  a  positive  and 
significant effect on the ratio of deposits to total savings for non-group members. 
However, this effect is only found once we have controlled for the interaction with the 
density of the network. When district fixed effects are included, however, the network 
effect for non-group members is much stronger and of a higher magnitude. Moreover, 
when the network is defined at district level strong positive effects are also observed. 
(See Panel A of Table A2 in the Appendix for the latter two results). This suggests 
that for non-group members the behavior of network members in closer proximity has 
a more significant impact on household behavior. 
 
For Farmer’s Unions we only find a positive effect when savings are disaggregated by 
formal and informal saving with the latter found to have a positive and significant 
effect.  However,  once  district  fixed  effects  are  included  we  find  a  positive  and 
significant effect on aggregate, and for informal saving. As for Women’s Unions, 
defining the network at district level also seems to be important with positive and 
significant effects observed (see Panel B of Table A2 in the Appendix). We find a 
very  strong  result  for  Veteran’s  Unions  where  the  network  effect  is  positive  and 
significant regardless of whether the interaction with the density variable is included. 
The effect is driven by informal savings. These results are robust to the inclusion of 
district fixed effects and are also present when the network is defined at district level 
(see Panel C of Table A2 in the Appendix). These results suggest that the savings 
behavior of the group not only impacts on the savings decisions of group members but 
also spills over to non-group members in the same community. The magnitude of the 
effect, however, is lower than that for group members. 
 
Overall, we find evidence that the savings behavior of socio-political groups in rural 
Vietnam has a positive influence on the deposit ratio of group members and non-
group members. Our theoretical model predicts that information disseminated through 
networks of this kind reduces the perceived riskiness of the return to choosing deposit 
saving as opposed to saving in the form of cash held at home. The evidence presented 
in this paper supports this theoretical prediction. In a more general context, our results 
suggest  that  these  groups  can  fill  the  role  of  formal  institutions  in  enhancing  the 
knowledge of individuals at local level.
28 This is not only the case for active members 
of these organizations but also for other households who benefit from information 
                                                 
28 See Hardin (2009) for a full discussion of the role of institutions in spreading both institutional and 
ordinary knowledge.   18 
spillovers.  In  a  policy  context,  targeting  information  on  the  benefits  of  saving  in 
financial institutions or local savings groups through groups of this kind could be 





Household savings are an important instrument for coping with risk in developing 
countries.  Moreover,  savings  are  an  important  means  of  financing  productive 
investment, particularly where there are credit constraints. Savings at the household 
level, however, are hindered by the fact that financial markets are not particularly well 
developed in many rural communities and many households either do not possess the 
information  required  to  set  up  formal  deposit  accounts  or  do  not  trust  formal 
institutions with their money. As a result, households often opt to hold their savings in 
the form of cash held at home, an insecure form of saving that does not yield a return. 
In this paper, we have explored the extent to which social networks in the form of 
formal group membership can play a role in imparting information about the merits of 
saving  where  potential  knowledge  gaps  exist,  thus  facilitating  savings  where  they 
would otherwise not be possible. This paper thus provides evidence of an important 
role for social capital in influencing economic decision making where information 
failures prevent economic agents from behaving in an optimal way. 
 
Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we have (i) proposed a 
model  where  the  level  of  financial  information  a  household  has  impacts  on  their 
perceptions of the returns to different forms of saving and (ii) suggested a mechanism 
through  which  social  networks,  may  correct  for  such  information  failures  by 
imparting knowledge about the returns to saving through the network, either through 
directly informing group members or through group members demonstrating optimal 
behavior to non-group members. Within our model, information of this kind has the 
potential  to  change  households’  perceptions  of  the  riskiness  of  different  forms  of 
saving, thereby altering their savings responses to changes in wealth. Second, we have 
provided empirical evidence of such a model at work in rural Vietnam. Specifically, 
we have analyzed the role of group behavior in household savings decisions for both 
group  and  non-group  members  where  the  groups  considered  are  well  established 
socio-political organizations operating at various levels within communities. Vietnam 
provides  a  particularly  interesting  case  study  for  two  reasons:  first,  given  the 
prominence of such organizations (namely, Women’s Unions, Farmer’s Unions and 
Veteran’s Unions); and second given that households hold large amounts of liquid 
assets as cash at home, an insecure and unproductive form of saving that does not 
yield  a  return,  suggesting  that  information  failures  do  exist,  particularly  in  rural 
communities. Our model suggests that disseminating information about the merits of 
saving through means that offer interest payments and opportunities for accessing 
credit could potentially stimulate more productive household savings. Controlling for 
endogeneity, reflexivity, exogenous and correlated group effects, and group density, 
we find evidence of this mechanism at work for all three groups considered. The 
results are robust to the inclusion of more disaggregated fixed effects and the regional 
level at which the network effect is defined. 
 
Overall, our results suggest that socio-political groups in Vietnam play an important 
role in correcting for gaps in information on the merits of saving at the community   19 
level. Our results imply that targeting information on the benefits of saving through 
these groups could be effective in increasing the number of households that save. This 
result can be generalized to other developing countries where well-established formal 
reputable groups operate at grassroots level. We propose that the mechanism through 
which this information sharing happens is through demonstration effects transmitted 
through reputable inter-personal networks, a mechanism difficult to replicate through 
formal  institutions.  The  cost  of  this  form  of  information  sharing  is  small  but  the 
benefits  could  be  significant.  As  suggested  by  Fafchamps  (2006)  fostering  ‘social 
capital’ of this kind as well as ensuring that the information disseminated by these 
groups is both accurate and desirable may be an appropriate policy response. These 
findings also open the door for further research analyzing the role of social capital in 
addressing other local market failures such as access to credit, property rights and 
other infrastructural deficits. 
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Household savings behavior 
  Total Savings  Deposits  Formal  Informal  Home 
% hhs who save (2006)  54.22  17.15  5.10  12.93  43.65 
% hhs who save (2008)  43.88  9.22  4.08  5.24  37.63 
     
For saving households:  VND  Of which (%): 
Average (2006)  8,525  26.89  7.69  19.20  73.11 
Average (2008)  12,237  17.72  7.94  9.78  82.28 
           
For saving households:           
Savings/income (2006)  24.40  11.33  4.04  7.29  13.07 
Savings/income (2008)  19.81  4.54  2.45  2.09  15.26 
Note: All value figures are adjusted using regional price deflators and are expressed in terms of June 
2006 prices. Inflation adjustment is based on Consumer Price Index figures available from the General 
Statistics Office of Vietnam. 
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Table 2 
Group membership and savings 
  Women’s Union  Farmer’s Union  Veteran’s Union 
  2006  2008  2006  2008  2006  2008 
% hhs active members  54.63  53.38  40.82  33.60  13.58  12.33 
% hhs who save  55.81  47.66  55.62  49.79  52.56  45.86 
For saving households:             
Mean level of saving  9,391  11,328  6,951  8,439  9,593  9,214 
Total savings as %  income  24.55  19.75  22.28  17.44  24.87  16.32 
Deposits as % total  28.41  14.87  24.86  13.49  36.58  19.09 
Formal deposits  as %  total  8.82  6.44  7.71  6.46  7.71  11.54 
Network savings:             
  Ha Tay  3,825  5,137  3,945  2,251  7,643  504 
  Lao Cai  1,755  298  1,472  314  278  1,905 
  Phu Tho  4,827  3,337  1,803  3,946  1,780  3,664 
  Lai Chau  388  0  0  0  852  0 
  Dien Bien  51  146  47  5  0  0 
  Nghe An  7,572  673  2,529  2,116  3,071  4,618 
  Quang Nam  3,799  2,809  5,496  1,258  7,047  678 
  Khanh Hoa  302  450  0  851  0  0 
  Dak Lak  7,709  1,029  4,890  363  29,249  0 
  Dak Nong  2,825  17,897  949  14,306  606  2,076 
  Lam Dong  1,228  1,262  2,636  2,087  406  0 
  Long An  3,018  2,900  2,435  2,146  3,496  809 
Average  3,585  3,130  2,812  2,291  5,728  1,224 
Network savings is defined as the average stock of savings in the form of deposits held by group 
members within an individual province at the beginning of the year. 
Note: All value figures are adjusted using regional price deflators and are expressed in terms of June 
2006 prices. Inflation adjustment is based on Consumer Price Index figures available from the General 
Statistics Office of Vietnam. 




  Description  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Stock  Stock of deposit savings at beginning of year:     
       2006  3,828  21,306 
       2008  3,237  23,152 
  Stock of home savings at beginning of year:     
       2006  3,540  12,940 
       2008  3,618  14,482 
Number of banks  Number of banks located in the commune   
       2006  0.47  0.69 
       2008  0.78  0.80 
Income  Total household income   
       2006  26,948  39,453 
       2008  40,942  66,737 
Household Size  Total number of individuals in household   
       2006  4.55  1.76 
       2008  4.53  1.79 
    Frequency (%) 
Income shock  Dummy =1 if household suffered an unexpected loss to income 
between 2006 and 2008 due to an exogenous shock  37.77 
Children Support  Dummy =1 if household receives financial support from children   
       2006  33.09 
       2008  14.27 
Note: All value figures are adjusted using regional price deflators and are expressed in terms of June 
2006 prices. Inflation adjustment is based on Consumer Price Index figures available from the General 
Statistics Office of Vietnam.   25 
Table 4 
Household savings model - baseline 
Deposits/Total Saving 
(change)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
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Became active WU 
   
0.009 
(0.026)     
Became inactive WU 
   
-0.028 
(0.025)     
Became active FU 
     
-0.001 
(0.029)   
Became inactive FU 
     
0.004 
(0.024)   
Became active VU 
       
-0.044 
(0.043) 
Became inactive VU 
       
0.005 
(0.040) 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.107  0.105  0.106  0.105  0.106 
n  1,903  1,728  1,728  1,728  1,728 
Standard errors are given in parenthesis, *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5 percent level, * denotes significance at the 10 percent level. Note: The drop in 
observations between column 1 and column 2 is due to missing commune level information.   26 
 
Table 5 
Household savings model - network effects on group members 
Deposits/Total Saving (change)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Panel A  Women’s Union 
Network Variable (Total Deposits)  0.096 (0.075)  0.298** (0.123)     
Density  -0.001 (0.003)  -0.023** (0.011)     
Density x Network (Total Deposits)    0.008** (0.004)     
Network Variable (Formal)      0.138* (0.080)  0.406*** (0.131) 
Network Variable (Informal)      0.0005 (0.097)  0.079 (0.159) 
Density      0.002 (0.004)  0.00002 (0.019) 
Density x Network (Formal)        0.013*** (0.005) 
Density x Network (Informal)        -0.003 (0.009) 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.1406  0.146  0.144  0.153 
n  689  689  689  689 
Panel B  Farmer’s Union 
Network Variable (Total Deposits)  0.214** (0.107)  0.225* (0.118)     
Density  -0.010 (0.006)  -0.014** (0.007)     
Density x Network (Total Deposits)    0.001 (0.006)     
Network Variable (Formal)      0.152 (0.175)  0.153 (0.194) 
Network Variable (Informal)      0.207** (0.109)  0.177 (0.162) 
Density      -0.005 (0.006)  -0.006 (0.011) 
Density x Network (Formal)        0.002 (0.007) 
Density x Network (Informal)        -0.002 (0.011) 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.232  0.232  0.233  0.233 
n  424  424  424  424 
Panel C  Veteran’s Union 
Network Variable (Total Deposits)  0.012 (0.030)  0.049 (0.033)     
Density  -0.0005 (0.018)  -0.194** (0.080)     
Density x Network (Total Deposits)    -0.036** (0.016)     
Network Variable (Formal)      0.012 (0.030)  0.059* (0.034) 
Network Variable (Informal)      0.003 (0.061)  0.028 (0.061) 
Density      0.002 (0.023)  -0.238*** (0.083) 
Density x Network (Formal)        -0.020 (0.018) 
Density x Network (Informal)        -0.063*** (0.021) 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.211  0.240  0.211  0.260 
n  153  153  153  153 
Standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  commune  level  and  are  given  in  parenthesis,  ***  denotes 
significance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level, * denotes significance 
at the 10 percent level. 
Note: All baseline controls are included in each model.   27 
 
Table 6 
Household savings model - network effects on non-group members 
Deposits/Total Saving (change)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Panel A  Women’s Union 
Network Variable (Total Deposits)  0.001 (0.001)  0.001* (0.001)     
Density  -0.001 (0.002)  -0.001 (0.002)     
Density x Network (Total Deposits)    0.0001* (0.00003)     
Network Variable (Formal)      0.001 (0.001)  0.001 (0.001) 
Network Variable (Informal)      0.001 (0.001)  0.001 (0.002) 
Density      -0.001 (0.002)  -0.001 (0.002) 
Density x Network (Formal)        0.0001 (0.00004) 
Density x Network (Informal)        0.0001 (0.00004) 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.080  0.085  0.080  0.085 
n  553  553  553  553 
Panel B  Farmer’s Union 
Network Variable (Total Deposits)  0.0005 (0.0005)  0.0004 (0.0005)     
Density  0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002)     
Density x Network (Total Deposits)    -0.0001*** (0.00002     
Network Variable (Formal)      -0.0004 (0.0006)  -0.001 (0.001) 
Network Variable (Informal)      0.004*** (0.001)  0.009*** (0.002) 
Density      0.002 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002) 
Density x Network (Formal)        -0.0002*** (0.00004) 
Density x Network (Informal)        0.0002*** (0.00005) 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.082  0.096  0.092  0.142 
n  887  887  887  887 
Panel C  Veteran’s Union 
Network Variable (Total Deposits)  0.001*** (0.0004)  0.001*** (0.0004)     
Density  -0.005*** (0.002)  -0.008*** (0.002)     
Density x Network (Total Deposits)    -0.0003*** (0.0001)     
Network Variable (Formal)      0.0001 (0.0005)  -0.0003 (0.0005) 
Network Variable (Informal)      0.006*** (0.001)  0.008*** (0.001) 
Density      -0.005*** (0.002)  -0.006*** (0.002) 
Density x Network (Formal)        -0.001*** (0.0001) 
Density x Network (Informal)        0.0005** (0.0002) 
Province Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.103  0.100  0.120  0.139 
n  1,519  1,519  1,519  1,519 
Standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  commune  level  and  are  given  in  parenthesis,  ***  denotes 
significance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level, * denotes significance 
at the 10 percent level. 
Note: All baseline controls are included in each model. 




Robustness checks of household savings model - network effects on group members 
Deposits/Total Saving (change)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Panel A  Women’s Union 
  Province level network  District level network 
Network Variable (Total Deposits)  0.302** (0.135)    0.001 (0.007)   
Density  -0.011 (0.009)    -0.046*** (0.017)   
Density x Network (Total Deposits)  0.008* (0.004)    0.002 (0.001)   
Network Variable (Formal)    0.268** (0.147)    -0.002 (0.009) 
Network Variable (Informal)    0.224 (0.176)    0.007 (0.008) 
Density    -0.024 (0.023)    0.047 (0.028) 
Density x Network (Formal)    0.008 (0.005)    -0.001 (0.002) 
Density x Network (Informal)    0.010 (0.010)    0.009* (0.005) 
District Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.285  0.289  0.278  0.284 
n  689  689  683  683 
Panel B  Farmer’s Union 
  Province level network  District level network 
Network Variable (Total Deposits)  0.237* (0.146)    0.011** (0.004)   
Density  -0.006 (0.010)    -0.026 (0.023)   
Density x Network (Total Deposits)  0.006 (0.007)    0.001 (0.001)   
Network Variable (Formal)    0.169 (0.223)    0.008 (0.011) 
Network Variable (Informal)    0.464** (0.189)    0.015*** (0.005) 
Density    0.028* (0.017)    0.003 (0.029) 
Density x Network (Formal)    -0.004 (0.009)    -0.003 (0.003) 
Density x Network (Informal)    0.027** (0.013)    0.002* (0.001) 
District Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.415  0.422  0.421  0.425 
n  424  424  424  424 
Panel C  Veteran’s Union 
  Province level network  District level network 
Network Variable (Total Deposits)  0.238** (0.112)    0.023 (0.028)   
Density  -0.369*** (0.121)    -0.007 (0.189)   
Density x Network (Total Deposits)  -0.058*** (0.020)    -0.013** (0.006)   
Network Variable (Formal)    0.263** (0.134)    -0.003 (0.034) 
Network Variable (Informal)    -0.317 (0.529)    -0.058 (0.069) 
Density    -0.367** (0.145)    0.289** (0.149) 
Density x Network (Formal)    -0.029 (0.028)    -0.005 (0.009) 
Density x Network (Informal)    -0.095*** (0.032)    -0.023** (0.011) 
District Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.638  0.650  0.562  0.573 
n  153  153  130  130 
Standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  commune  level  and  are  given  in  parenthesis,  ***  denotes 
significance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level, * denotes significance 
at the 10 percent level. 
Note: All baseline controls are included in each model.   29 
 
Table A2 
Robustness checks of household savings model - network effects on non-group members 
Deposits/Total Saving (change)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Panel A  Women’s Union 
  Province level network  District level network 
Network Variable (Total Deposits)  0.003*** (0.001)    0.006*** (0.001)   
Density  0.006 (0.006)    0.018** (0.009)   
Density x Network (Total Deposits) 0.0001*** (0.00003)    0.0004*** (0.0001)   
Network Variable (Formal)    0.006*** (0.001)    0.008*** (0.002) 
Network Variable (Informal)    -0.0006 (0.002)    0.006** (0.002) 
Density    0.006 (0.006)    0.019** (0.009) 
Density x Network (Formal)    0.0002*** (0.00004)    0.0004*** (0.0001) 
Density x Network (Informal)    0.00002 (0.00005)    0.0008*** (0.0002) 
District Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.321  0.340  0.325  0.3434 
n  553  553  535  535 
Panel B  Farmer’s Union 
  Province level network  District level network 
Network Variable (Total Deposits)  0.001** (0.001)    0.002** (0.001)   
Density  0.015** (0.007)    -0.019** (0.009)   
Density x Network (Total Deposits) -0.0001** (0.00003)    0.000 (0.000)   
Network Variable (Formal)    -0.0001 (0.001)    0.0002 (0.0009) 
Network Variable (Informal)    0.008*** (0.002)    0.007*** (0.002) 
Density    0.015** (0.007)    -0.018** (0.009) 
Density x Network (Formal)    -0.0002*** (0.00004)    -0.0001 (0.0001) 
Density x Network (Informal)    0.0002*** (0.00005)    0.0003*** (0.0001) 
District Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.273  0.307  0.271  0.280 
n  887  887  810  810 
Panel C  Veteran’s Union 
  Province level network  District level network 
Network Variable (Total Deposits)  0.002*** (0.0005)    0.005*** (0.001)   
Density  -0.009 (0.021)    0.003 (0.005)   
Density x Network (Total Deposits) -0.0003*** (0.0001)    0.0001** (0.00005)   
Network Variable (Formal)    0.0005 (0.0005)    0.005*** (0.002) 
Network Variable (Informal)    0.008*** (0.001)    0.005** (0.002) 
Density    -0.008 (0.021)    0.003 (0.005) 
Density x Network (Formal)    -0.0007*** (0.0001)    0.0001** (0.00006) 
Density x Network (Informal)    0.0006*** (0.0002)    0.0001 (0.0001) 
District Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.207  0.228  0.200  0.200 
n  1,519  1,519  1,243  1,243 
Standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  commune  level  and  are  given  in  parenthesis,  ***  denotes 
significance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level, * denotes significance 
at the 10 percent level. 
Note: All baseline controls are included in each model. 
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